How the Encryption Fits Together
Every Vault starts with its own random 256-bit master key. Derived keys protect the contents, while your passphrase protects the unlock process. If you choose Dual-Key Protection, a separate post-quantum key is also required to recover the master key.
- ✓ AES-256-GCM: Authenticated encryption protects Vault contents and detects tampering. AES-256 is considered resistant to known quantum attacks, but no cryptographic design can promise immunity from every future attack.
- ✓ Argon2id: A memory-hard password derivation function turns the passphrase into unlock material. The passphrase is required in both standard and Dual-Key modes.
- ✓ ML-KEM-1024: The optional NIST-standardized post-quantum key-encapsulation mechanism establishes a shared secret. HKDF derives a wrapping key from that secret, and AES-256-GCM wraps the master key.
- ✓ What ML-KEM does, and what it doesn't: ML-KEM-1024 protects access to the master key. It does not encrypt every file a second time.
Pre-release interface. Details may change before launch.
Where Should the Second Key Live?
Dual-Key Protection will require both your passphrase and an ML-KEM-1024 private key. You can keep that private key tied to one Mac or make it available through your Apple account on supported Macs.
- ✓ Device-bound: ML-KEM-1024 private-key operations use the Secure Enclave. A device-bound representation is kept in the local Keychain, so the Vault is tied to that Mac.
- ✓ Account-bound: The ML-KEM-1024 private-key seed is stored in the user's synchronizable iCloud Keychain for access on supported Macs signed in to the same Apple account.
- ✓ Your Vault stays separate: iCloud Keychain carries the account-bound key seed, not the Vault's files or its AES master key.
- ✓ Your passphrase still matters: Neither custody option replaces the Vault passphrase.
Pre-release interface. Details may change before launch.
Still to Come Before Launch
We're still building Finder integration, optional file disguises, and decoy Vaults that can present alternate content under coercion. We will not claim verified plausible deniability unless the complete system passes the required security tests.
- ✓ macOS 27 and Apple silicon: The suite's planned public release requires macOS 27 or later on an Apple silicon Mac.
- ✓ Finder access: The current design uses Apple's FSKit framework to present an unlocked Vault in Finder without a legacy kernel extension.
- ✓ Decoy Vaults: Planned alternate Vault content is intended to help in coercion scenarios. The final behavior and limitations will be published after validation.
- ✓ Plausible deniability testing: Release validation will examine file structure, timing, Keychain artifacts, logs, backups, mounting behavior, and error paths for practical differences.
Pre-release interface. Details may change before launch.